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FANTASIES AND ILLUSIONS:
ON LIBERTY, ORDER, AND FREE MARKETS
BernardE. Harcourt*

INTRODUCTION

In an opening passage of The Birth of the Clinic, Michel Foucault
describes a treatment and cure for hysteria-what was called at the time
"vapeurs" or "the neurosis of distinguished ladies.", It was an eccentric
cure that Dr. Pierre Pomme developed and discussed in his 1763 treatise, Traiti des affections vaporeuses des deux sexes. It involved taking
baths for "ten or twelve hours a day, for ten whole months"2 and resulted in what Pomme saw and described as, "membranous tissues" peeling
away and "pass[ing] daily with the urine," "the right ureter also
peel[ing] away and [coming] out whole in the same way," and the intestines "peel[ing] off their internal tunics" and "emerg[ing] from the rectum."3

Foucault suggests that we are today incapable of making sense of
Pomme's discourse. In contrast to the medical discourse of anatomical
dissection of the nineteenth century, which remains legible to us,
Pomme's treatise, "lacking any perceptual base," Foucault writes,
"speaks to us in the language of fantasy."4 The word Foucault uses, in
the original, is "fantasmes,"5 the form of the common genus that privi-

* Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, and Professor and Chairman of the
Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago. Special thanks to Renata Salecl and
Jeanne Schroeder for bringing us all together to fantasize about markets, to all the participants,
and to Simon Critchley for their thoughts and comments on this essay.
1 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL

PERCEPTION ix (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Vintage Books 1994) (1973); see also HENRI F.
ELLENBERGER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF DY-

NAMIC PSYCHIATRY 187 (1970) (discussing Pierre Pomme's analysis of hysteria in his treatise,

Traitd des affections vaporeuses des deux sexes: oi l'on a tdchi de joindre d une thdorie solide
unepratiquesdrefondde sur des observations).
2 FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at ix (quoting Pomme) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id.
4 Id. at x.
5 MICHEL FOUCAULT, NAISSANCE DE LA CLINIQUE. UNE ARCH OLOGIE DU REGARD MWDI-

CAL vi (1963) (Fr.).
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leges sight. The term carries a visual, hallucinatory element.6 Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, in his Phenomenology of Perception, writing in 1945,
would deploy the term "fantasme"in precisely this sense of a hallucinatory vision.7 Foucault eventually would come to regret the emphasis on
the visual or perceptive element, on the "gaze," on the idea of "medical
perception," especially six years later in The Archaeology of Knowledge.8
But the earlier use of the term was never meant to be exclusively visual.
It was about our inability to see and say, together: to comprehend.
Pomme's discourse is, today, a "fantasme"in that it is not, or is no longer in our realm of truth-"dansle vrai (within the true) of contemporary
biological discourse," as Foucault would intimate.9 It is fantasy to us
because Pomme "spoke of objects, employed methods and placed himself within a theoretical perspective totally alien" to us.' 0 As Foucault
explained a year later in his inaugural lecture at the College de France,
"one would only be in the true. .. if one obeyed the rules of some discursive 'policy' which would have to be reactivated every time one
spoke.""I
Earlier in the century, in 1927, Sigmund Freud published The Future of an Illusion, using the term "illusion" to capture the notion of a
desired set of beliefs. 12 The guiding principle of usage was wish fulfillment, or as he wrote, "fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind."3 The German term Freud used was "einer
Illusion,"l4 a term intended to connote the strength of the beliefs: "The
secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes," Freud explained.15 Religious belief, which Freud defined as "teachings and assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which
tell one something one has not discovered for oneself and which lay
claim to one's belief,"16 are illusions; but as illusions, they are not the
same thing as errors, nor are they necessarily erroneous. "Illusions need
6 See CENTRE NATIONAL DE RESSOURCES TEXTUELLES ET LEXICALES, http://www.cnrtl.fr/

definition/phantasme (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (Fr.) (defining "phantasme").
7 See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PH NOMENOLOGIE DE LA PERCEPTION 344 (1945) (Fr.)
("Je voyais en marge de mon champ visuel et Aquelque distance une grande ombre en mouvement, je tourne le regard de ce c6t6, le fantasme se r6tricit et se met en place : ce n'6tait qu'une
mouche prbs de mon oeil. J'avais conscience de voir une ombre etj'ai maintenant conscience de
n'avoir vu qu'une mouche.").
8 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE 54 n.1 (Tavistock Publ'ns Ltd. 1972) ("In this respect, the term 'regard m6dical'
used in my Naissance de la clinique was not a very happy one.").
9 Cf id. at 224 (discussing Mendel).
10 Cf id. (discussing Mendel).
11 Id.
12 See SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (James Strachey trans., 1961).
13 Id. at 30.
14 Id.
15 Id.

16 Id. at 25.
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not necessarily be false-that is to say, unrealizable or in contradiction
to reality."17 Similarly, they are also not the same as delusions, whose
essential character is to be "in contradiction with reality."18 "Thus we
call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in
its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just
as the illusion itself sets no store by verification."l9
Sixty years earlier, in 1867, Karl Marx had famously used the metaphor of the "phantasmagoria"-the theatrical use of a laterna magica to
project frightening images on a screen-to describe commodity fetishism.20 Here too, religion played an important role as a central analogy
for this form of mystification: "In order ... to find an analogy we must
take flight into the misty realm of religion," Marx claimed. "There the
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed
with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other
and with the human race."21 The same is true with things qua commodities, Marx explained: "It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the [phantasmagoric] 22 form of a relation between things."23 The idea, here too, involves
an optical illusion. And, of course, Marx used the notion of perception,
of the optic nerve, of sight, as a way to distinguish this particular phenomenon-the fetishism of commodities-from our perceptible senses:
In the same way, the impression made by a thing on the optic nerve
is perceived not as a subjective excitation of that nerve but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye. In the act of seeing, of course,
light is really transmitted from one thing, the external object, to another thing, the eye. It is a physical relation between physical things.
As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the
products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material
[dinglich] relations arising out of this.24
Marx's discussion of commodity fetishism is steeped in visual allegories-in sight and optics. The phantasmal dimension of Marx was

17 Id. at 31.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 165 (Ben Fowkes trans.,

Vintage Books 1977).
21

Id.

22 Though it is translated as "fantastic" in this and most other English translations, it should
read "phantasmagoric" as in the original German where it is "die phantasmagorischeForm." See
generally CAROLINE EVANS, FASHION AT THE EDGE: SPECTACLE, MODERNITY, AND DEATHLINESS 89 n.4 (2007); DAVID KAZANJIAN, THE COLONIZING TRICK: NATIONAL CULTURE AND
IMPERIAL CITIZENSHIP IN EARLY AMERICA 228 n.52 (2003).

23 MARX,supra note 20, at 165.
24 Id.
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pronounced.25
Foucault's fan tasmes, Freud's illusion, and Marx's phantasmagoria:
these represent, to my mind, a surprising inversion of the signifier. I
would have expected Foucauldian illusions, Freudian fantasies, and,
well, Marxian ideologies. But their texts resist, even though the subsequent history of usage would vary. Psychoanalysis, as we all know,
would embrace the notion of fantasies,26 while Foucault would eventual-

ly reject, vehemently, the concept of illusions,27 and the Frankfurt
School would turn, as we know well, to Ideologiekritik.28
How then do these terms-phantasms and fantasies, illusions and
delusions, ideologies-relate to each other when we are dealing with a
phenomenon like "the market"? Today, we so often imagine markets as
living, volitional, or agentic objects, as things onto which we project
social relations, or as entities with autonomous or quasi-autonomous
existence. It is commonplace, today, as Jean and John Comaroff suggest,
"to displace political sovereignty with the sovereignty of 'the market,' as
if the latter had a mind and a morality of its own."29 Our fantasies of the
"free market" join together the imaginary of a living market with the
desire for freedom, giving birth to this organism of the market that can
exist freely, that can manage itself and flourish and prosper, that can
regulate itself, and that can shower benefits on us all. (Though, of
course, if it is in fact a living thing, then it could equally well be satanic,
a little devil, a monster).
How exactly do we theorize the fantasy versus the illusion? How do
the different ways in which we describe our imagination of the marketwhether in terms of fantasies, illusions, ideologies, or some other kin
term-reflect different dimensions of that imagination? And how can
we make progress, if necessary, if possible, in formulating a better way
of exploring and discussing all this? These are the tasks of this essay.
First, to explore how each one of these connected terms helps describe
our imagination of the market today-our fantasies of orderliness, our
desire for freedom, our myth of the free market. Second, to move forward in articulating a more productive formulation in furtherance of a
critical enterprise.
25 Marx also deployed the notion of illusion; the monetary system, for instance, Marx de-

scribed explicitly as "the illusions of the Monetary System." Id. at 176; see also JACQUES
DERRIDA, What is Ideology? in SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF
MOURNING & THE NEW INTERNATIONAL (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994).
26 This is especially apparent in Slavoj Ziiek's reading of Lacan. See SLAVOJ 212EK, THE
PLAGUE OF FANTASIES (1997); see also SLAVOJ Z12EK, From Che vuoi? to Fantasy: Lacan with

Eyes Wide Shut, in How To READ LACAN 40 (2007).
27 See infra p. 107.
28 See RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS & THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL 39-41 (1981) (contrasting ideology, illusion and delusion). See generally id. at 26-44.
29 Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Millenial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second
Coming, 12 PUB. CULTURE 291, 333 (2000).
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IMAGINING THE FREE MARKET: FANTASIES AND ILLUSIONS

In her marvelous book Choice, Renata Salecl explores our latemodern anxiety over choosing through the lens of the Lacanian concept
of "the Big Other"-the imaginary social order of language, institutions,
and culture that make up our social space. 30 This imaginary social order,
Salecl suggests, mediates our anxiety with choice-choice that has become a central, identifying notion of late-modernity. Through various
mechanisms, we find ways of binding ourselves precisely in order to
limit choice. Salecl writes: "[M]y claim is that people already form their
own self-binding mechanisms, although these are not developed consciously: they are not 'rational' strategies. People limit their choices by
themselves, or they act as though someone else had imposed limits for
them."31
In her text, Salecl discusses Dany-Robert Dufour's provocative
suggestion that "in postmodernity there is no more symbolic Big Other"
and that "in such a society the market becomes the Big Other."32 That
would be the free market, I take it-which seems entirely right, in important and intriguing ways. The orderliness of the free market and the
lack of choice-the naturalness of the free market-are central to alleviating our anxiety. The combination of order and liberty seems to be
precisely what relieves us of choice. Salecl adds: "In order to find at least
temporary stability in terms of our identity, we create a fantasy scenario
about the consistency of the social sphere we inhabit."33
It is this notion of a fantasy scenario that brings us to the heart of
our inquiry and of this symposium on fantasy and markets-and it raises the central question of the different valences of the terms illusion and
fantasy. Let's see if we can make any progress with the terms themselves.
The element of desire in the notion of "fantasy," naturally, emphasizes wish fulfillment in the Freudian sense, but also an idea of playfulness. There is something enjoyable, often libidinal, which satisfies the
person who believes. It satisfies a desire. It tastes good. Think of the
illustrations that Freud uses in his own discussion: the middle-class girl
who imagines that a prince will sweep her away, the alchemist who believes that he can turn metals into gold, our hope that children are
"creatures without sexuality," or even racist beliefs like those of "certain
nationalists that the Indo-Germanic race is the only one capable of civi-

lization."34
It is never clear, of course, whether fantasies benefit or harm us.
30 See RENATA SALECL, CHOICE 59

Id. at 145.
32 Id. at 67.
33 Id. at 59.
34 FREUD, supra note 12, at 30-31.
31

(2010).
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They do both. Surely though, they are not only harmful. Fantasies can
make life bearable, though they can also lead us to error. As compared
to delusions, or even illusions perhaps, fantasies can be a wonderful
escape. The funny thing about fantasies, though, is that sometimes they
are so extravagant or unrestrained that the person fantasizing should
know, herself, that they are unreal. In that sense, the person may be
complicit in the act of fantasizing.
By contrast, the illusion is less playful or libidinal, at least today. It
is more closely related to the delusion, a term that underscores, first,
clear departure from reality, but second and more importantly, the idea
of unflattering self-deception. The person who believes, in the case of a
delusion, is deceiving herself often in a grandiose manner. She bears
responsibility. She is somehow the creator; she gave birth to that deception. Both the illusion and delusion have a strong element of the phantasm, which underscores the spectral element-the visual-but through
that, the idea of projection, raising the question of agency and subjectivity: who is it that is projecting the image? The phantasmagoria may have
created a spectral, haunting image on the background of the theatre
stage, but it required someone projecting the image.
Some of this is reflected in Raymond Geuss's discussion of Freud's
distinction between error ("Irrtum"), illusion ("Illusion"), and delusion

("Wahnidee") in The Future of an Illusion. On Geuss's reading, the
Freudian error consists in no more than "a normal, everyday, false factual belief, e.g. the belief that Sigmund Freud was born in Vienna."35 By
contrast, the Freudian delusion is, according to Geuss, "a false belief an
agent holds because holding this belief satisfies some wish the agent
has";36 the example here is of "a man who falsely believes that he is
Charlemagne because this belief satisfies his wish to be an important
historical personage."37 And the Freudian illusion, as we saw earlier,
may or may not be false or in error, but "is held by the agent because it
satisfies a wish."38 Here is Geuss's rendition of the example of the middle-class girl who believes-or, rather, has the "illusion"-that a prince
will come sweep her away: "It may in fact turn out that a prince does
come and marry her-in Freud's Vienna there were such princes
around, although probably not very many, so the girl's chances were
rather slim-but the reason she believes that she will marry a prince is
that this belief satisfies some wish she has."39
35 GEUsS, supra note 28, at 39. He was born in Freiberg, in Mhren, Moravia, in the former
Austrian Empire; incidentally, his birth name was Sigismund Schlomo Freud.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 39. Notice that this, of course, would verge on a diagnosable mental illness under
contemporary standards; elsewhere, Geuss uses the terms "delusion" and "false consciousness"
interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 19-20, 60.
38 Id. at 39.
39 Id. at 39.
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The difficulty in all this, of course, is that the signifier shifts along
with the signified. As Geuss elegantly notes, even Freud's treatment "is
not as clear and unambiguous as one might wish."40 The terms are defined differently in different contexts, and the theorists themselves shift
course from one text to another. There is no Archimedean point. Foucault's writings are a good illustration.
During the early 1970s, Foucault used the term "illusion" freely. In
his 1974 lectures on Psychiatric Power, in fact, Foucault would use the
term to pinpoint one of his more penetrating interventions-the claim
about the illusion of Man:
What I call Man, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is nothing other than the kind of after-image [image rdmanente] of this oscillation between the juridical individual ... and the disciplinary individual .... [And] from this oscillation between the power claimed
and the power exercised, were born the illusion and the reality of
what we call Man. 41
Similarly, in those lectures, and in 1975 in Discipline and Punish,
Foucault drew importantly on the notion of optics and optical illusions
to discuss the panopticon prison.42
However, a few years later, Foucault would reject the term "illusion"-as well as, for that matter, the word "error" (and, of course, "ideology"43). For Foucault, regimes of truth are by no means a mere illusion, even though they are made to appear and eventually will
disappear. Madness, delinquency, and sexuality are not illusions, even if
they are the product of a whole series of practices that gave birth to
something that did not exist beforehand and continues not to exist.44
Foucault's project, he himself would emphasize, did not seek to demonstrate that these things are no more than "villainous illusions or ideological products that must be dissipated in the light of reason"-"devilaines
illusions ou des produits iddologiques i dissiper4 la [lumidre] de la raison
enfin montle a son zenith."45 Instead, as Foucault explained in his lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics in 1979, "The goal of these studies is to
demonstrate how the pairing of series of practices and regimes of truth

40

See id. at 39.

41 MICHEL FOUCAULT, PSYCHIATRIC POWER: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1973-

1974, at 58 (Jacques Lagrange ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2003) (emphasis added).
42 See, e.g., id. at 77; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRIS-

ON 200-02 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
43 Foucault was more consistent in resisting the term "ideology." For a general discussion,
see Bernard E. Harcourt, Radical Thought from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, Through Foucault,
to the Present: Comments on Steven Lukes's In Defense of "False Consciousness," 2011 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 29 (2011); and Foucault's discussion of ideology in FOUCAULT, supra note 8, at 184.
44 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, NAISSANCE DE LA BIOPOLITIQUE: COURS AU COLLEGE DE FRANCE

1978-1979, at 21-22 (2004) (Fr.).
45 Id. at 21.
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forms an apparatus of knowledge-power that marks effectively in reality
that which does not exist and submits it to the exclusion of truth and
falsity."46 Nevertheless, in all his investigations, these things that still do
not exist, even though they have been born and are indeed something
real, are not mere illusions: "They are not an illusion since it is precisely
a set of practices, of real practices, that have established them and mark
them imperiously in the real."47
Foucault's own usage of the term "illusion" would shift over time as
he toiled over the signification he would give the concept. But of this, of
course, we are all familiar-we who toil over words for a living. None of
the terms has a natural content or valence. In the end, exploring the
somewhat contingent dimensions of each word may not be as helpful as
examining closely the object itself-the free market. So let me turn
there.

II.

PROPOSING A THEORY OF THE IMAGINARY

Here, then, is the most precise articulation of what I would call the
fantasy or the illusion of free markets. First, there is a widely shared,
dominant belief in this country that free markets are better and more
efficient than government regulation; that, in effect, the state tends to be
incompetent when it comes to economic regulation. This is captured
well by Barack Obama, who stated, during the 2008 campaign, that free
markets are "the best mechanism ever invented for efficiently allocating
resources to maximize production."48 The opinion polls offer ample
support. For instance, in a Financial Times/Harris Poll opinion poll
conducted in September 2007, forty-nine percent of respondents in the
United States answered affirmatively-in contrast to seventeen percent
who responded negatively-to the question: "Do you think a freemarket, capitalist economy (an economic system in which prices and
wages are determined by unrestricted competition between businesses,
with limited government regulation or fear of monopolies) is the best
economic system or not?"49 In a twenty-nation poll conducted by the
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of
46 Id. at 22.
47 Id. Foucault would develop these themes as well in his lecture, Michel Foucault, Qu'est-ce

que la critique? [Critique et Aufldrung], Socidtdfranfaise de philosophie (May 27, 1978), in
BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE FRANQAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE, t. LXXXIV, 1990, p. 35-63, translatedin
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH 41-82 (Sylvire Lotringer ed., 2007).
48 David Leonhardt, A Free-Market-Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally Conservative Wealth
Redistributionist,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at MM30.
49 See Press Release, Harris Interactive, Six Nation Survey Finds Little Enthusiasm for Free

Market Capitalism in Western Europe or the United States (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://
www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive- Poll-Research-FT-economics-2007-09.pdf.
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Maryland, researchers found that an average seventy-one percent of
respondents in the United States agree with the statement that "[tihe
free enterprise system and free market economy is the best system on
which to base the future of the world"; only twenty-four percent of respondents disagreed with that statement.50 Although those polling results preceded the Great Recession of 2008, they continue to reflect contemporary reality. In August and September 2009, a Gallup Poll survey
found that the majority of Americans "believed that there was either too
much regulation, or about the right amount," whereas only a quarter of
Americans felt there was "too little government regulation of business
and industry."51 In another poll conducted in January 2010, Gallup
found that fifty-seven percent of Americans were "worried that there
will be too much government regulation of business," with only thirtyseven percent of Americans worrying that there will not be enough.52
On a related question, Gallup discovered that "[h]alf of Americans believe the government should become less involved in regulating and
controlling business, with 24% saying the government should become
more involved and 23% saying things are about right."53There is a dominant belief in this country that the free market system is better than
government regulation.
Second, this shared conviction rests on an underlying belief that
free markets actually exist, in other words that there can be spaces of
voluntary, compensated economic exchange that are not or are less regulated, or that are self-regulated. It is premised, in essence, on either a
categorical distinction between free markets and regulated economies
or, alternatively, on a spectrum from free to regulated market economies. This is evident from the very questions posed in the polling data:
underlying the questions and answers is a shared belief that some forms
of economic organization involve more, and others less, government
regulation. To most people, this is simply assumed; but it is nevertheless
important to spell it out here because, in truth, it represents a complex
production of truth, firmly held, and deeply entrenched, with a long
history going back at least to the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and eighteenth century debates over public economy. The contemporary idea of
the efficiency of competitive markets traces back to the introduction of
the idea of natural order into economic thought in the writings of
50 See Program on International Policy Attitudes, 20-Nation Poll Finds Strong Global
Consensus: Support for Free Market System; But Also More Regulation of Large Companies,
available at http://www.globescan.com/news-archives/pipamarket.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2012).
51 See Frank Newport, Americans Leery of Too Much Gov't Regulation of Business: Republicans in ParticularAre Worried About Too Much Government Regulation, GALLUP.COM (Feb. 2,
2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 25468/Americans- Leery-Govt-Regulation-Business.aspx.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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Franqois Quesnay, Mirabeau, and Le Mercier de la Rivibre. It traces back
to their famous Tableau kconomique, which was one of the first conceptualizations and visualizations of a space of economic exchange that
could thrive best without governmental interference. 54
Third-and here is where matters become more contested-the
free market does not exist. The categorical distinction between free and
regulated economies-or the spectrum, if you prefer, since a spectrum is
no more than a graduated expression of binary difference-is erroneous
and misleading. As I argue in The Illusion of Free Markets, there is no
such thing as a free market: all markets, all forms and venues of economic exchange are man-made, constructed, regulated, and administered by often complex mechanisms that necessarily distribute wealth in
large and small ways.55 The state is always present in market organization and its level of involvement does not change much. In a purportedly free market, the state is just as present, enforcing private contracts,
preventing and punishing trespass on private property, overseeing,
regulating, and enforcing through criminal, administrative, and civil
sanctions the market transactions themselves, and distributing wealth
through the tax code, military spending, bureaucratic governance, and
myriad other means. The state creates, maintains, and regulates free
markets extensively-criminalizing market bypassing, fraud, misrepresentation, and other deviations from the "orderly" course of human
affairs. Whenever the state is not explicitly directing economic behavior
or setting prices-as, for instance, in controlled economies-it is nevertheless present in equal magnitude, enforcing breaches of contract,
criminalizing insider trading, corners, and unfair trade practices, defining and protecting private property, and punishing black-market activity. In the end, the categories of free and regulated markets are misleading heuristic devices.
Fourth, and finally, these misleading categories are deeply entrenched in our systems of knowledge and belief, and they have real
effects-what we would call, in French, "des effets de virit6." Even
though they are not themselves true, correct, or accurate, they have
"truthful" effects on the real world. They are not mere mistakes that can
easily be corrected. The belief in free markets has produced a significant
redistribution of wealth in society. It has legitimized the fantasy of less
regulation-of what has been euphemistically called "deregulation." By
playing on this fantasy, the financial and political architects of our
economy over the past four decades-both Republicans and Democrats-have been able to mask massive redistribution of wealth by
claiming they were simply "deregulating" the economy, when all along
54 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE

MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 86-87 (2011).
55 Id. at 176-90.
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they were actually re-regulatingfor the benefit of their largest campaign
donors.
Re-regulation of the economy over the past forty years has had
tangible effects on distributions of wealth in the country. As the sociologist Douglas Massey minutely documents in his book CategoricallyUnequal, following decades of improvement, the income gap between the
richest and poorest in this country has dramatically widened since the
1970s, resulting in what social scientists now refer to as a "U-curve" of
increasing inequality.56 Recent reports from the Census Bureau confirm
this, with new evidence emerging last month that "the number of Americans living below the official poverty line, 46.2 million people, was the
highest number in the 52 years the bureau has been publishing figures
on it."s? Today, twenty-seven percent of African-Americans and twentysix percent of Hispanics in this country-more than one in four-live in
poverty.5 8 One in nine African-American men between the ages of
twenty and thirty-four are incarcerated. Not to put too fine a point on it:
today, as Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times reports, "the 400
wealthiest Americans have a greater combined net worth than the bottom 150 million Americans"; "[t]he top 1 percent of Americans possess
more wealth than the entire bottom 90 percent"; and "in the Bush expansion from 2002 to 2007, 65 percent of economic gains went to the
richest 1 percent."59 These are real effects shaped, in part, by the dominant belief in free markets, privatization, and "deregulation."
This, I take it, would be one precise articulation of a possible claim
of illusion or fantasy. Naturally, it raises a number of questions along
the different dimensions and valence of the terms that we might usedelusion, illusion, fantasy, phantasm, ideology. Are the categories of free
and regulated markets the product of wish fulfillment? Do they satisfy
desires? Are they productive in either positive or negative ways? Are we
fooling ourselves when we believe them? Are we responsible for these
beliefs, or at fault for continuing to believe? Are there others who are
projecting these images for us to consume? Are there people running a
phantasmagoria? These are some of the questions that I imagine would
be posed by the different vocabulary. I will address a few of them now.
To begin with, does the belief in the free market satisfy anyone's
desires or fulfill a wish? As a factual matter, I believe, it could be shown
that the wealthier in our society have indeed benefited during the recent
period of renewed faith in free markets since the 1970s. The truth is that

56 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM (2007).
57 Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2011, at Al.
58 Id.
59 Nicholas Kristof, America's "PrimalScream,"N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR11.
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the complex regulatory mechanisms necessary for a colossal latemodern economy like ours inevitably distribute wealth in large and
small ways. Tax incentives for domestic oil production and lower capital
gains rates are obvious illustrations. But there are all kinds of more minute rules and regulations surrounding our wheat pits, stock markets,
and economic exchanges that have significant wealth effects: limits on
the ability of retail buyers to flip shares after an IPO; rulings allowing
exchanges to cut communication to non-member dealers; fixed prices in
extended, after-hour trading; even the advent of options markets.60 The
mere existence of a privately-chartered organization like the Chicago
Board of Trade, which required the State of Illinois to criminalize and
forcibly shut down competing bucket shops, has large distributional
wealth effects on farmers and consumers-and, of course, bankers, brokers, and dealers.61 The growing economic inequality in this country
during a period that can only be fairly described as "neoliberal" suggests
that the belief in the free market may well have served the economic
interests of the political and social elite, who shape state regulation. It
has certainly not served the economic interests of the middle- and lower-class (most members of the Tea Party and the Occupy movement, for
instance). This has been productive for many, clearly, but not for others.
For the former, it has been somewhat better perhaps than wish fulfillment. For the latter, it may satisfy a desire without necessarily realizing
it.

What exactly is that desire? For the mass of Americans who do not
benefit materially from these beliefs-and I am thinking here, naturally,
of the vast majority of Tea Party members who do not form part of the
top wage earners in this country-what desires are being met? There is
no doubt that the vast majority of Tea Party members embrace the idea
of the free market. It is something that largely defines the movement.
The Tea Party Patriots, an umbrella organization of more than two
thousand local Tea Party groups that best reflect the grassroots origins
of the movement, has taken as its motto: "Limited government, fiscal
responsibility, and free markets."62 This is a constant refrain throughout
the larger social movement. Dick Armey states in Give Us Liberty, for
instance, that "[t]he most powerful, proven instrument of material and
social progress is the free market. The market economy, driven by the
accumulated expressions of individual economic choices, is the only
economic system that preserves and enhances individual liberty."63 Sarah Palin echoes these sentiments in her book Going Rogue: "No one
60 See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 176-90.
61
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62 KATE ZERNIKE, BOILING MAD: INSIDE TEA PARTY AMERICA 143 (2010).
63 DICK ARMEY & MATT KIBBE, GIVE US LIBERTY: A TEA PARTY MANIFESTO 156 (2010)
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person is smart enough to control and predict markets. The free market
is just that: free to rise or fall, shrink or expand, based on conditions that
are often outside human control."64 Palin adds: "Government interference in market cycles is just as dangerous as government-directed programs that encourage permanent dependency. In both cases the rewards
for responsible behavior and the penalties for irresponsible behavior are
removed by the state."65 Or, more succinctly, Palin declares, "America
was built on free-market capitalism, and it is still the best system in the
world."66 Similarly, Glenn Beck declares in his Common Sense: "You
cannot take away freedom to protect it, you cannot destroy the free
market to save it, and you cannot uphold freedom of speech by silencing
those with whom you disagree. To take rights away to defend them o- to
spend your way out of debt defies common sense."67
What these passages reveal is the intimate connection between the
belief in the free market and the wish for freedom and individual liberty.
What is also revealed is the connection between being American, being
a patriot, and certain feelings of superiority to those of other nationalities and cultures. In this sense, the belief in the free market may well
have a dimension of the illusion, in a Freudian sense, insofar as it satisfies particular desires. This is, at least, consistent with what Kate Zernike
has found. Zernike writes: "To its activists, the Tea Party movement
quickly became something more than a protest. It was more like a religion. It had given them a community, and it had given them a cause,
which they embraced like a crusade."68 Zernike continues:
The language and the symbols of the movement helped encourage
that sense of mission, the feeling that they were the true patriots. But
for many people, there was enough appeal in simply having that
community, a place to get out their frustrations. Outsiders who underestimate the movement failed to appreciate how much it had
come to mean to those involved.69
It is also consistent with many of the writers from whom Tea Party
members draw inspiration, such as Ayn Rand, Friedrich Hayek, Milton
Friedman, William F. Buckley, and the French philosopher Frederic
Bastiat.70 Glenn Beck has, as we all know, sent sales of Hayek's The Road
64 SARAH PALIN, GOING ROGUE: AN AMERICAN LIFE 389-90 (2009).
65
66

Id. at 390.
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68 ZERNIKE, supra note 62, at 124.
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to Serfdom skyrocketing.71
The belief in free markets, moreover, is not simply delusional. It is
not just self-deception. There are people who have aggressively promoted these theories, including thinkers such as Hayek and Friedman, and
politicians such as President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. But, as I have argued elsewhere, I think it is also important
to explore the subjective dimension of these beliefs.72 It is a bit too easy
to always point fingers at neoconservative thinkers and absolve ourselves of any responsibility. 73 In fact, a large part of the critical intervention in The Illusion of Free Markets is precisely to explore our own involvement in the widely shared belief in the incompetence of
government in the economic realm-shared, as we have seen, by a vast
majority of the American people. It is important to explore how that
idea has flourished since the eighteenth century; why there has been so
little resistance; and what other interests or fantasies it has served in the
process. What has made it so irresistible to so many people?
And here, I suspect, part of the answer must lie in the seduction of
freedom. The appeal of liberty is indeed a powerful motivatorespecially when it is tied, as it has been since the Physiocrats, to the notion of orderliness. Hayek himself recognized this well.74 The idea of
natural order is so seductive. As David Harvey suggests, "[c]oncepts of
dignity and individual freedom are powerful and appealing in their own
right. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the
students in Tiananmen Square."75 They are precisely what made the
Physiocrats sound so revolutionary in their day. It is what gave them so
much momentum and made them so influential. And it is what propelled their beliefs into the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

Renata Salecl provocatively writes in Choice that "[flollowing Walter Benjamin's prediction that capitalism would function as a new form
of religion, some today argue that the market has become God: until the
recent financial crisis anyone opposed to the dogma of the free market

script) (on file with author).
71 See Justin Lahart, The Glenn Beck Effect: Hayek Has a Hit, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2010,
6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/06/17/the-glenn-beck-effect-hayek-has-a-hit/.
72 Harcourt, supra note 43, at 46-48.
73 Id. at 48.
74 See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 124-33 (2007) (1944).
75 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 5 (2005).
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economy was labeled a heretic."76 It is amusing to discover, in light of
this, that a recent survey of religious attitudes reveals that an unexpectedly large percentage of Americans associate the free market with god.
According to the most recent Baylor Religion Survey of 1,714
American adults, about twenty percent of Americans "combine a view
of God as actively engaged in daily workings of the world with an economic conservative view that opposes government regulation and
champions the free market as a matter of faith."77 As sociologist Paul
Froese, co-author of the survey, suggests, "[t]hey say the invisible hand
of the free market is really God at work."78 "They think the economy
works because God wants it to work. It's a new religious economic idealism," Froese explains:79
When Rick Perry or Michele Bachmann say "God blesses us, God
watches us, God helps us," religious conservatives get the shorthand.
They see "government" as a profane object-a word that is used to
signal working against God's plan for the United States. To argue
against this is to argue with their religion.80
It is amusing to see how reality mimics theory. The concepts of
fantasy, illusion, and phantasmagoria were, from the start, closely associated with the religious sphere. Recall that Marx drew on religion as the
best analogy for the mystification of commodities, and Freud explored
the future of religion as a form of illusion. Still today, the religious dimension remains extremely enlightening, especially insofar as it reveals
how beliefs that are non-evidentiary can become "truthful" and gain
traction.
What bothered Foucault most with the term "illusion," in his later
work, was that it signaled (to him at least) that beliefs could be easily
dismissed as false or did not have "real" effects.81 There is something to

that, on some interpretations of the term "illusion." Freud, for instance,
imagined that psychoanalysis could dispel illusions. He wrote, regarding
the illusion that children are without sexuality, that the belief could be
"destroyed by psycho-analysis."82 Some might argue, of course, that the
full psychoanalytic method is extremely demanding. I have no doubt
that that is true. But Foucault's point, ultimately, rings true as well. In
the end, it is important to recognize how these imaginaries-how re76 SALECL, supra note 30, at 67.
77 Cathy
Lynn
Grossman,
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Survey Reveals Many See God Steering Economy, Government As Meddlers, USA TODAY, Sept.
20, 2011, at 5B; Deus ex machina: Faith in the Free Market, ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:23
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/09/deus-ex-machina.
78 Grossman, supra note 77.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 21-22.
82 FREUD, supra note 12, at 31.
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gimes of truth, illusions, and fantasies-have truthful effects. It is important to emphasize that they have real effects-real effects of truth.
And it is these effects that matter most.

